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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

ARBRA JOHNSON,
Plaintiff/Appellee

CASE NO. 96057-CA

v.
MERRILL D. JOHNSON,
Defendant/Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

AN APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, THE HONORABLE SANDRA PEULER, JUDGE

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT:
"Tr." refers to the transcript of the proceedings of the trial
of this case, "R" refers to the Record on Appeal, and "Ex." refers
to exhibits received into evidence by the District Court.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION:
This court has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant to
the provisions of Sections 3 and 5, Article VIII of the Utah
Constitution, and Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARDS FOR REVIEW:
ISSUE ONE:
THERE WAS NO SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES WARRANTING
A MODIFICATION OF THE DECREE OF DIVORCE.(R. 259-262)
STANDARDS OF REVIEW:

a. On appeal the appellate court must review the facts in the
light most favorable to the prevailing party. Lamkin v. Lynch, 600
P2d 530 (Utah, 1979).
b. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is without
adequate evidentiary foundation or if it is induced by an erroneous
view of the law.

Cove View Excavating & Const, v. Flynn, 758 P2d

474 (Utah, 1988).
c. In reviewing the trial court's findings, the clearly
erroneous standard is applied.

Bell v. Elder. 782 P2d 545 (Utah,

1990) .
d. Conclusions of Law are reviewed on appeal for correctness
without any deference to the trial court. Cove View Excavating &
Const, v. Flynn. supra.
ISSUE TWO:
EVEN IF THERE WAS A SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES THE
FACTS DO NOT WARRANT A MODIFICATION OF THE DECREE AS A MATTER OF
EQUITY.(R. 259-262)
STANDARDS OF REVIEW:
See the standards of review for Issue One above.
ISSUE THREE:
THE ATTORNEYS FEES AWARDED TO MRS. JOHNSON WERE FAIR AND
REASONABLE.(R. 259-262)
STANDARDS OF REVIEW:
See the standards of review for Issue One above.
ISSUE FOUR:
THERE WAS NO CONTRACT CREATED BETWEEN THE PARTIES TO REDUCE OR
2

ELIMINATE THE ALIMONY AWARD TO MRS. JOHNSON.(R. 259-262)
STANDARDS OF REVIEW:
See the standards of review for Issue One above.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
(A) Nature of the Case:
The parties were divorced in 1990 after a marriage of 24 years
by the Third District Court. Mrs. Johnson was awarded alimony as
well as child support for the two children who were still minors.
The Decree of Divorce was later modified to increase the alimony to
$550.00 per month.

Mr. Johnson subsequently filed a petition to

modify the Decree to eliminate the alimony on the grounds that (a)
the parties had entered into a binding agreement to eliminate the
alimony

and

(b)

there

had

been

a

substantial

change

circumstances warranting the elimination of the alimony.
were

additional

issues

concerning

arrearages

but

these

in

There
were

resolved by stipulation and are not issues in this appeal.
Mrs. Johnson filed a Counterclaim asking that the alimony be
increased and that Mr. Johnson be ordered to provide her with
assistance in making repairs to the family home.
(B) Course of Proceedings:
A trial was held by the Third District Court, the honorable
Sandra Peuler presiding, on the 12th day of June, 1996 after the
parties were unable to reach a settlement of the issues.
(C) Disposition in Lower Court:
The District Court found that there had been no substantial
change in circumstances warranting a modification of the Decree for
3

either party. Thus the position of the parties remained unchanged
and the alimony amount remained the same.

The court also found

that even if there were a substantial change the facts did not
warrant a modification based upon the facts and as a matter of
equity. (R. 258)
The court granted Mrs. Johnson judgments for back alimony and
attorney's fees and permitted Mr. Johnson to make monthly payments
on those amounts. (R. 258)

Mr. Johnson then appealed the court's

decision. (R. 269)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. Arbra Johnson and Merrill Johnson were married to each
other on May 7, 1966 in Salt Lake City. (R. 1)
2. Mrs. Johnson filed for divorce in November of 1989. (R. 1)
A trial was held before the honorable Richard H. Moffat on the 18th
of October, 1990, and the marriage was dissolved by a Decree of
Divorce which became final on the 21st of December, 1990. (R. 132)
3. During the course of the marriage the parties had three
children/ two of which were still minors at the time the Decree was
entered.

(R. 125)

4. In its Findings of Fact at the time of the original trial,
the District Court found that Mr. Johnson's average monthly income
was $3,100.00. (R. 125)
5. Those same findings found that the average monthly income
of Mrs. Johnson was $110.00.

(R. 126)

6. The court also found that Mrs. Johnson was in need of
alimony and ordered Mr. Johnson to pay to her the sum of $350.00
4

per month, with that sum to increase to $550.00 per month when the
second youngest child attained her majority.

(R. 127)

i . The court found that the real property of the parties had
a fair market value of $52,000.00, and that Mr. Johnson was
entitled to a line of $8,500.00, (R. 128) , which sum was to be paid
when the youngest child reached 18 (R. 129), or one of the other
usual contingencies.

None of the contingencies have occurred as

yet in this case.
8. At the original trial the court made the following finding:
"It is the intent of the court that when Plaintiff has
obtained a college degree (other than an associate degree),
that Defendant should have the right at that time to
petition the court to review the issue of alimony
for the purpose of determining whether alimony should be
terminated or substantially reduced. To that end,
alimony shall continue for four (4) years. At the end
of the four-year period Defendant shall have the right to
petition the Court for the purpose of determining whether
alimony should be reduced or terminated. If at any time
during the four-year period, Plaintiff does not maintain
enrollment as a full-time student, Defendant shall
have the right to petition this Court in regards to
reducing or terminating alimony. [Last portion of paragraph
13] (R. 127)
9. Essentially the same wording was embodied in the Decree of
Divorce. (R. 134)
10. Both of the parties are 50 years of age. (R. 189; R. 238)
11. Mr. Johnson is employed as a sales representative by Time
Distributors.

(R. 238)

He testified

$3,500.00 and $4,000.00 per month.

that he earns between

(Tr. 62)

12. The District Court's finding at the trial in this matter
was that he earned $3,800.00 per month. (R. 260) This was based
upon his 1994 Federal Income Tax Return (Ex. P-5) and his testimony
that his income for 1995 had been the same as it had been in 1994.
5

(Tr. 78)
12. Mrs. Johnson is employed as a Human Resources Assistance
for the L.D.S. Church, and earns a gross monthly

salary of

$1,573.00. (Tr. 20)
13. At the time of the divorce she had begun operating a
beauty salon out of her home;

the District Court found that she

earned $110.00 per month from its operation. (Tr. 12; R. 126) She
has

continued

to

operate

that

salon

and

currently

earns

approximately $200.00 per month. (Tr. 23)
14. Mrs. Johnson's net income from her employment with the
L.D.S. Church is only $493.04 every two weeks, or approximately
$1,083.82 per month. (Ex. P-7;

R. 259)

15. She receives $294.00 per month from child support for the
one child living in the home. (R. 259)
16. Mr. Johnson's net income each month is $2,600.00

and his

expenses, including his child support obligation, total $2,083.00
per month. (R. 260;

R. 240;

Ex. D-10) The net figure for Mr.

Johnson is derived by the court from his financial declaration and
Exhibit D-10 submitted by him.

That exhibit totals the above

amount from the line after taxes paid, thus providing his actual
net figure. (See Tr. 69)
17. Mr. Johnson lives with a woman by the name of Dialyn
Meyers, who is employed at the University of Utah. (Tr. 79)
18. Mr. Johnson testified that the only thing she paid towards
the household expenses was to buy some of the food. (Tr. 80)
19. Mr. Johnson owns a motorhome, lives in condominium,
6

dresses well, takes trips, and recently took a trip to Hawaii.
(Tr. 81)
20. Mr. Johnson testified that he paid for all of the rent,
all utilities and most of the other living expenses for both
himself and the lady with who he lives and that contributes nothing
except some of the food purchases.

(Tr. 81)

21. The woman with whom he lives has no children.

(Tr. 81)

22. Mrs. Johnson's adjusted gross income on her 1995 Federal
Income Tax return was $19,201.00

(Ex. P-6)

23. Mr. Johnson's income before alimony on his 1994 Federal
Income Tax return was $47,586.00.

(Ex. P-5) .

24. Mr. Johnson's total income for 1990, the year he was
divorced, was $60,478.00. (Ex. P-2)

This was the year that his

projected income was to only be a gross of $3,100.00. (R. 125-126)
25. Mr. Johnson has had sufficient income to put money into an
IRA account every year since the divorce, including the year of the
divorce. (Ex. P-2; Ex. P-2)
26. In March of 1995 Mr. Johnson telephoned Mrs. Johnson and
asked if asked if she was going to continue asking for alimony now
that she was employed. (Tr. 34) Mr. Johnson was very agitated and
the conversation degenerated into a somewhat one-sided argument.
(Tr. 34) He also made threats and used intimidation to try and get
her to agree to a reduction in alimony. (Tr. 92)
27. Mrs. Johnson told him during the conversation that she
felt the alimony was necessary income for her and the minor child
and that she would not agree to terminate the alimony. (Tr. 36)
7

Mrs. Johnson summarized the conversation in a writing immediately
after the conversation, the contents of which are set forth in the
writing marked and received as Exhibit P-9. (Tr. 34)
28. A conversation was had around this same time between
counsel for Mr. Johnson and Mrs. Johnson.

Mrs. Johnson did not

agree to terminate alimony in her conversations with counsel. (Tr.
36) She testified that she had no incentive to terminate, that she
needed the money to live on. (Tr. 37)
29. She testified that she received no consideration from Mr.
Johnson to alter or terminate the alimony obligation, except that
through his attorney an offer of one lump sum payment of $1,000.00
was made to her to terminate the alimony.

She refused. (Tr. 37,

94)
30. There were efforts between counsel for Mr. Johnson, Mr.
Johnson and Mrs. Johnson in late 1994 about changing the alimony to
$170.00 per month for five years but no agreement was ever reached.
(Tr. 17-20)
31. The minor child turns 18 in May of 1997, at which time
Mrs. Johnson will lose the income from the child support. (Tr. 32)
32. During the four years that Mrs. Johnson worked on her
degree from the University of Utah she paid for all of the books
and tuition, with some help from State rehab and some through a
Pell grant.

(Tr. 29)

Mr. Johnson paid nothing towards her

educational expenses. (Tr. 29)
33. The only retirement Mrs. Johnson has is a matching fund
through her employer, but to be eligible she must withhold no less
8

than 1% and not more than 17%.
the minimum of 1%. (Tr. 31)
is unable to afford more.

(Tr. 31) Mrs. Johnson has withheld

She doesn't withhold more because she
(Tr. 32)

34. Mrs. Johnson an account with Oppenheimer with $7,784.00 in
it.

(Tr. 25-26, 32) However, this money has been slowly set aside

by Mrs. Johnson over the years since the divorce in order to be
able to pay Mr. Johnson his $8,500.00 equity lien in the family
home at the time the last child turns 18 in May of 1997. (Tr. 26)
35. There were questions about the possible value of the home,
and Mrs. Johnson had put in her Financial Declaration that she
thought the home was worth about $85,000.00

(R. 191), but she

testified that she really had no sound idea of how much the home
was worth, and in fact felt that there was a question as to how
much the home was worth due to the deterioration of the property.
(Tr. 27)

I

36. She testified that she would need to be spending about
$200.00 per month into maintenance in the home, but has in fact put
nothing into a fund or into actual home maintenance due to a lack
of funds.

(Tr. 27)

37. Mrs. Johnson's monthly expenses at the time of trial were
approximately $1,824.00 as set forth in her Financial Declaration.
(R. 189) This was the finding of the District Court. (R. 259)
38. She has two other small accounts but those are her
checking account and an account for taxes. (Tr. 32) Those amounts
are insignificant in any event.

(R. 189)

39. Mrs. Johnson is supposed to pay estimated taxes to the
9

Internal Revenue Service on her beauty salon income, but is unable
to do so due to a lack of money. (Tr. 33)
40. Mrs. Johnson testified that in her opinion the alimony
amount of $550.00 was necessary for her to pay her living expenses,
and so informed Mr. Johnson during their prior conversation in late
1994.

(Tr. 36) She has found that her ability to pay her basic

subsistence expenses has diminished since Mr. Johnson quit making
alimony payments. (Tr. 41-42)
41. Mrs. Johnson testified that she never agreed at any time
to terminate the alimony, either with Mr. Johnson or with his
attorney. (Tr. 36)
42. When Mr. Johnson unilaterally

ceased making alimony

payments Mrs. Johnson was not able to subsist on her income from
her job and her beauty shop.

(Tr. 38)

43. Mrs. Johnson has found it necessary to supplement her
income through assistance from neighbors, her church, and her
family. (Tr. 38)

For example, on her birthday she was given a box

of meat by her mother and sister because they can't afford meat.
She makes the box last for about 6 months. (Tr. 38)
44. At Christmas of 1995 she received an anonymous letter with
$100.00 in it at her employment, which was used to buy Christmas
needs.
45. For Christmases of 1994 and 1995 Mrs. Johnson's church
also provided her with food and money.
46. Since the time of the divorce the only clothing that Mrs.
Johnson has been able to buy for herself has been one inexpensive
10

dress. (Tr. 39)
47. Some used clothing has been given to her by friends, but
for all intents and purposes the clothing Mrs. Johnson wears today
is the same clothing she owned prior to the divorce.

(Tr. 39-40)

She is in need of new clothing for her job, but to date has had to
make use of clothing that is rapidly wearing out. (Tr. 56)
48. Mrs. Johnson qualifies for the Circuit Breaker program,
which provides tax relief by means of paying property taxes for
indigents.

Last year they paid $300.00 towards Mrs. Johnson's

property taxes.

(Tr. 40)

49. Marilyn, the minor child

living with Mrs. Johnson,

receives free lunches at her high school due to Mrs. Johnson's low
income. (Tr. 41)
50. Mrs. Johnson is unable to provide clothing, entertainment
money and some other necessary expenses for the minor child, which
has necessitated that the minor child obtain a job, which she uses
to buy clothes, school supplies, and the like.

(Tr. 41)

51. Mrs. Johnson's washing machine broke down last year and
her church paid to have it repaired, but in the meantime she had to
use a scrub board and bucket to do her laundry for a period of
about five weeks. (Tr. 42)
52. She has a dishwasher in the home, but it doesn't work(Tr.
42-43) , her sewing machine is broken (Tr. 46) , and

she has to

borrow a vacuum cleaner from a neighbor because hers is broken (Tr.
52) .
53. She has been the recipient of anonymous gifts and money,
11

food, and clothing have been furnished by friends and neighbors.
(Tr. 43-44)
54. The condition of the home in which Mrs. Johnson and her
child live is deteriorating, and many items are broken or in a
dilapidated condition.

Many of the curtains are sun rotted (Tr.

44) ; the legs on the couch are broken (Tr. -46) ; the closet doors
in the bedrooms don't work or are broken (Tr. 46); her bed frame
is broken and her bed is on the floor (Tr. 46); the plumbing and
other items associated with her beauty salon are either not up to
code, are broken or deteriorating (Tr. 48-49);

the back deck is

substantially deteriorated (Tr. 49).
55. Mrs. Johnson does not have the funds to make repairs to
the home and in her opinion the continuing deterioration of the
home is affecting the fair market value of the home. (Tr. 49-50)
56. Mrs. Johnson and the child for their meals eat a lot of
rice, macaroni, potatoes and the like.

They are unable to afford

much in the way of fruits and vegetables. (Tr. 52)
57. Mrs. Johnson is not able to take vacations or trips and
enjoys very little in the way of recreation. (Tr. 50)
58. Prior to the divorce Mrs. Johnson had her own car, had
plenty of money to eat well, went on a variety of trips, they ate
out

often,

participated
oriented

belonged

to

a

in a variety

dinner
of

club,

went

recreational

and

to movies

and

entertainment

activities, had nice clothes, and the children had

opportunities to travel and participate in a variety of activities.
(Tr. 50-51)
12

59.

For Mrs. Johnson

to live

in the way

she does is

humiliating to her. (tr. 56)
60. Mrs. Johnson was able to only pay a small portion of her
attorney's fees for the trial of this matter and nothing has
changed since then and Mr. Johnson is in a superior position to pay
and should be ordered to pay Mrs. Johnson's costs and fees for this
appeal. (Tr. 54; Ex. 8)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1. The appellant has failed to marshal his evidence as
required by this court.
2. No contract was ever entered into between the parties to
either terminate or reduce the alimony payments.
3. There has been no substantial change in circumstances
warranting a modification.
4.

Even

if

there

has

been

a

substantial

change

in

circumstances warranting the court to examine the conditions of the
parties, the financial situations of the parties do not warrant a
modification of the alimony amount.
5. The District Court in the Decree of Divorce did not intend
that the alimony only last for the time it took Mrs. Johnson to
obtain a bachelors degree from the University of Utah.
6. The award of attorney's fees in the amount of $1,500.00 for
Mrs. Johnson and against Mr. Johnson was fair and reasonable.
7. Mr. Johnson should be ordered to pay Mrs. Johnson's
attorney's fees and costs for this appeal.
ARGUMENT
13

POINT I;
THE APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT
OF HIS POSITION IN THIS APPEAL.
In a large variety

of

cases our appellate

courts have

repeatedly required an appealing party to marshal the evidence.
For example, in Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 817 P2d 789 (Ut.
1991) , at 799, the court held that where a party challenges a lower
court ruling that party " . . . must marsha the evidence in support
of

the

verdict

and

then

demonstrate

that

insufficient when viewed in the light most

the

evidence

is

favorable to the

verdict."
The court then went on to observe that the appealing party "
11

. . . . has made no attempt to marshal the evidence in
support of the jury finding of fraud. In fact, all
Fire Insurance has done is argue selected evidence favorable
to its position. That does not begin to meet the marshalling
burden it must carry. We do not sit to retry the facts."
Mr. Johnson's brief has done the same thing.

He has merely

selected certain facts or interpretations of facts that he believes
supports his position, all the while ignoring all of the other
facts in the case. Obviously the District Court made its decision
based upon
Therefore,

facts other than those argued by
the

factual

arguments

of

Mr.

the appellant.

Johnson

should

be

overlooked and this court should only be concerned with determining
whether the law has been correctly applied to the facts, and those
facts to be accepted by this court must be those as found by the
District Court in its Findings of Fact. Since Mr. Johnson has made
no real attack on the law as it was applied to the facts the
decision should be affirmed.
14

POINT II:
NO ACCORD AND SATISFACTION OR OTHER FORM OF AGREEMENT
WAS CREATED BETWEEN THE PARTIES TO EITHER REDUCE OR
ELIMINATE THE ALIMONY.
j
In the appellant's petition to modify the Decree of Divorce
(R. 175) he essentially argues an accord and satisfaction was
created between the parties to eliminate entirely his alimony
obligation to Mrs. Johnson.

We submit that no such agreement was

ever reached for the following reasons:
1. From the Financial Declaration, the testimony and other
data, it is clear that Mrs. Johnson and the child were living in a
semi-impoverished state since the Decree, that at the time of the
alleged discussions about alimony she was not employed, and then
became employed but was on a probation status for 90 days.
this time Mr. Johnson was living very comfortably.

All

Why would Mrs.

Johnson give up $550.00 per month for no reason when that money was
so desperately needed.

To agree to such a thing makes no sense.

2. Mr. Johnson alleges that an agreement was reached between
the parties in October of 1994 to terminate the alimony after she
found employment. She did not find employment until that following
February.

Mrs. Johnson has adamantly denied

that any such

agreement was ever reached by the parties or even seriously
discussed as far as she was concerned. Mr. Johnson was undoubtedly
serious about wanting the alimony dropped, but Mrs. Johnson was
equally serious about wanting it to continue.
Our appellate courts have repeatedly held that an accord and
satisfaction is a contractual arrangement, it must contain all of
15

the elements of a valid contract, and is governed by the las
dealing with contracts. Cannon v. Stevens School of Business, 611
P2d 705 (Utah, 1971) .

The rules pertaining to such a situation

dictate that an accord and satisfaction is used to discharge a
prior obligation and as a result it is an absolute necessity that
new consideration be given. (Id.)

In our case we have no elements

of a contract extant in the dealings between the parties. There is
a total lack of any type of consideration.

If Mr. Johnson insists

that a contract was created, what were its terms, and where is the
consideration he is giving his former wife to warrant her loss of
$550.00 per month in alimony.
3. We further submit that there was never a meeting of the
minds on the matter. Exhibit P-9 is a memorandum Mrs. Johnson made
immediately after a telephone call between her and Mr. Johnson on
March 18, 1995. In this writing she summarizes the content of that
conversation, well after the date of the alleged agreement between
them.

It is evident there was no agreement at the time alleged by

Mr. Johnson to eliminate any alimony or otherwise modify the
Decree.

The discussions between her and counsel for Mr. Johnson

produced nothing either.

These were initiated by counsel and/or

Mr. Johnson and not by Mrs. Johnson.
As the District Court found in its Findings of Fact, there was
some discussion about modifying the Decree but there was clearly
never any agreement reached by the parties.
4. Our courts have held that an accord and satisfaction may
pertain to any type of obligation or theory of recovery, and, that
16

the party alleging the accord and satisfaction has the burden of
proving its elements.

Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Const. Co., 701

P2d 1078 (Utah, 1985).

Nothing present in the record provide any

evidence that any of the elements of an accord and satisfaction
have been met. The appellant should therefore not prevail on this
point.
We think that the District Court's finding on this matter well
summarizes our point,

The court found as follows:

"There is evidence that the parties discussed alimony
termination, but there is no evidence that there was
ever a meeting of the minds on any terms of an agreement
to terminate. Although offers and counteroffers were
made over a period of time there was never an agreement
reached nor any offer accepted by either party." (R. 261,
#18.)
POINT III
IT WAS NOT THE INTENTION OF THE DISTRICT COURT IN THE
DECREE OF DIVORCE TO ELIMINATE ALIMONY WHEN MRS. JOHNSON
COMPLETED HER SCHOOLING, BUT RATHER, ONLY INDICATED THAT
MR. JOHNSON WOULD BE FREE TO PETITION THE COURT TO CONSIDER
WHETHER OR NOT THE DECREE SHOULD BE MODIFIED.
This court is well aware that he purpose of alimony is to
"enable the receiving spouse to maintain as nearly as possible the
standard of living enjoyed during the marriage and to prevent the
spouse from becoming a public charge."
395, at 397 (Utah App. 1987)

Eames v. Eamesf 735 P2d

Mrs. Johnson was married to the

appellant for over 24 years, bore him three children, and worked in
the home as a homemaker rearing the children for the entire term of
the marriage.
training.

She had a high school degree and no advanced

Mr. Johnson has argued that the alimony should be

eliminated because that was the intent of the trial judge, i.e.,
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that the alimony should be rehabilitative only, and last for a
limited period of time. However, the Decree states no such thing,
but merely states the right of Mr. Johnson to bring the matter
before the court to show a change in circumstances warranting an
elimination of the alimony, which he was allowed to do if she did
not attend school or if she did attend school and graduated.

The

wording in the Decree is not some type of preapproved elimination
of alimony.

This is exactly the situation in Olson v. Olson, 704

P2d 564 (Utah, 1985), where the court was faced with circumstances
where the wife was a high school graduate and had spent the
majority of the marriage bearing and rearing the parties' children.
The court held that a limitation of the alimony after two years
time, during which the wife was to obtain further education and
training, was an abuse of discretion, with the result that the
appellate court made the alimony award of $1,600.00 per month
permanent, rather than allowing it to be limited to a particular
period of time.
In the instant case the wording in the Decree in fact doesn't
make a lot of sense. Mrs. Johnson could easily have quit school or
never started due to the extreme financial burdens she faced, in
which event Mr. Johnson supposedly had the right to come in and ask
the court to modify the decree. Under Mr. Johnson's interpretation
of the Decree Mrs. Johnson could have been left without alimony
within months after the divorce. It was only through a herculean
effort that she was able to complete her schooling.
should

be

something

she

is

entitled
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to

The alimony

regardless

of

her

educational pursuits or accomplishments.
In Martinez v. Martinez, 754 P2d 69 (Utah App. 1988) the court
was faced with a similar situation and again struck down a limited,
rehabilitative alimony, stating that even if the wife did obtain
further education, there was no l!. . . reasonable expectation of
obtaining employment two years hence that will enable her to
support herself at a standard of living even approaching that which
she enjoyed during the marriage." (Ibid, at 75) [Emphasis added]
We submit that Judge Moffat's intent was not to create a short term
alimony award, but if it was he was in error in doing so.
In Andersen v. Andersen, 757 P2d 476, 478-479

(Utah App.

1988), the district court had awarded the plaintiff $300.00 per
month alimony until she completed her schooling or became employed
full-time.

"The court found that defendant would have only $843

per month from which to pay the $300 per month alimony and his own
living expenses, while plaintiff would have $300 per month alimony
and $200 per month earnings and no rent payments."

This is much

different than the instant action where Mr. Johnson's income is
substantially greater than Mrs. Johnson's income.
| The court in Andersen, after citing a number of similar cases,
and the reasons for alimony, stated that " . . .

we agree with

plaintiff that the court abused its discretion in terminating her
alimony when she completes her schooling or becomes employed full
time, "

citing

the

Jones

case

in

which

the

court

found

rehabilitative alimony to be inequitable. (Id.) The court went on
to rule as follows:
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"As in Jones and Olson, plaintiff is in her 50's, has
spent most of her life providing services to her family
with no remuneration, and has minimal work experience.
Given that lack of work experience she cannot be expected
to immediately find a job upon completing of her schooling.
Also, her salary when she does find employment is unknown.
The speculative nature of her future was corroborated during
appellant argument when counsel represented that plaintiff
had completed school, her alimony had terminated and she
had not found employment. Under the facts in this case, the
court's order terminating plaintiff's alimony upon completion
of her schooling without requiring proof that her financial
circumstances had materially changed is an abuse of
discretion and places an unwarranted burden on plaintiff."
(Id.)
We think it is important to recognize that it was foreseeable
by the District Court in the original divorce proceedings that Mrs.
Johnson would complete her income and improve upon her $110.00 per
month income from her beauty shop. Yet knowing this the court did
not decree that alimony automatically terminate upon the completion
of her education.

It was also foreseeable that Mrs. Johnson may

not have been able to afford schooling and would have had to find
other employment, yet the court did not order the alimony to
terminate automatically upon the occurrence of those circumstances.
All the court did was tell Mr. Johnson when the earliest date was
that he could bring a petition to modify if he thought
circumstances warranted it.
POINT IV:
THERE HAS BEEN NO SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES
WARRANTING THE COURT TO EXAMINE OTHER FACTORS AND MODIFY
THE DECREE OF DIVORCE.
It is well established that a party must first show that there
has been a substantial change in circumstances before the court is
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allowed to exercise its equity powers to determine whether or not
the original Decree should be modified. [See, e.g., Hogge v. Hogge,
649 P2d 51 (Utah, 1982)] We must examine now whether Mr. Johnson
has met that burden.
The parties were divorce in October of 1990 after over 24
years of marriage.

The Findings of Fact in the original hearing

found that for purposes of determining child support and alimony
the (defendant's average monthly
employer, would be $3,100.00.

income, as projected by his

It is difficult to see how this

could have been the projected income since he received a total
income of $60,478.00 for that year before he deducted from that
amount alimony to Mrs. Johnson of $2,690.00 and his IRA deduction
of $2,000.00, for an adjusted gross of $55,788.00. (Ex. P-2)
The District Court in this proceeding found his income after taxes
to be $2,600.00, (R. 260) and his monthly income to be $3,800.00.
(R. 260)

His expenses, including child support, were found to be

$2,083.00. (R. 260)

As for Mr. Johnson, there is also the matter

of the woman with whom he is living.
The district court made no specific findings on that matter,
but we submit that his testimony that he lives with a woman with a
full time job who contributes essentially nothing to their living
expenses
testified

and

entertainment

that

he

had

no

to be
idea

totally
what

her

unbelievable.
income

was

He
(also

incredible), and that he paid for virtually all of the expenses.
Where does her money go??

It is obvious to everyone that this

woman does contribute to the household income, and if she doesn't
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then Mr. Johnson has more money than he is telling us, and his
generosity is great, but very misplaced.

If he wishes to be so

generous then he can share than generosity with his former with of
24 years who bore and raised his three children, rather than
expending his largess on some live-in girl friend who supposedly
freeloads off him.

This whole scenario is ludicrous.

We submit that the truth of the matter is that this woman does
contribute to the household income, that Mr. Johnson was not
telling the truth about this, and that he thus enjoys the benefit
of a second relatively substantial income in his home.
Mrs. Johnson's income from her job, after taxes, was found to
be $1,083.82, her child support is $294.00, and her gross income
from her shop is $200.00 per month. (R. 259)

Her living expenses

were found to be $1,824.00 per month, which leaves her short
approximately $250.00 per month in meeting her basic expense needs.
(R. 250)
Her income from alimony, her token shop income and child
support at the time of the divorce was $1,048.79.

We fail to see

that this amount is significantly different from her current
income.

In either case she is still short of meeting basic

subsistence level expenses. In short, Mr. Johnson's income has
increased more than Mrs. Johnson's has since the divorce.
On page 14 of Mr. Johnson's brief he makes various arguments
fraught with error.

To begin with, he asserts

that Mr. Johnson

earned $3,100.00 at the time of the divorce. (If we consider the
court's findings to be accurate at that time that is true.
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However, his reported income for that year on his income tax return
showed an income considerably higher.

We cannot help but believe

that his evidence regarding his projected income for that year was
grossly in error.)

Be that as it may, his income was $3,100.00.

They then argue that his current income is $2,600.00.

They do

state that one is gross income and the other net, but we must
emphasize that the figures they set forth are a gross figure for
the date of the divorce and a net figure currently.

In addition,

at the time of the divorce Mr. Johnson was paying child support for
two children and Mrs. Johnson was receiving that money, amounted to
$588.00 per month.
The appellant's portrayal of Mrs. Johnson's income being only
$110.00 at the time of the divorce and $1,283.00 now is grossly
misleading and unfair. At the time of the divorce Mrs. Johnson was
receiving the child support of $588.00, plus the $110.00, plus
alimony of $350.00 per month, for a total of $1.048.00.

Mr.

Johnson quit paying alimony when he thought he had paid enough, one
of the children reached her majority, and the third child will
reach 18 next spring, leaving her with the current income from her
job, plus something in the area of $200.00 GROSS from her hair
salon.

And that is if she is able to keep it operating, which

given the circumstances

is highly questionable, both

from a

practical standpoint since her job now consumes much of her time
leaving her less time to work in her salon (R.90), as well as
legally, since the license for her business may not be renewed if
she cannot correct certain plumbing and other defects. (R. 48-49)
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Thus, the $200.00 they show as part of her net income is in fact
gross income and is in jeopardy.
We

are

clearly

circumstances.

not

talking

about

a

1066%

change

in

If the appellant picks and chooses as he has done

he could come up with any percentage of increase.

But the facts

are different from what he has represented them to be.

The truth

of the matter is that Mrs. Johnson's income has experienced an
increase, but substantially less than they represent, and one which
we submit is not substantial enough to cut her off from her alimony
payment.

With the alimony income and the child support for the

next few months she would be able to catch up a little, and when
the child support disappears her income would only be about $500.00
more than she had before, which still leaves her in a very tight
financial situation.
We further submit to this court that the original amount of
income that Mrs. Johnson had was woefully inadequate. The alimony
will improve her situation a bit, but she is hardly going to live
lavishly on her income from both job and alimony.
Mrs. Johnson has made it as long as she has.

It is a wonder

To take away her

alimony would only serve to penalize her for working hard to obtain
a degree and a job. It will also only accelerate and perpetuate her
decline deeper into poverty.
Mr. Johnson next argues that Mrs. Johnson has accumulated
$9,184.00 in savings. Actually this is in error. The amount in her
Oppenheimer

account

is $7,077.06

(R. 190), and Mrs. Johnson

testified that this is money she has painstakingly scraped together
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the last few years to pay Mr. Johnson his $8,500.00 lien amount in
the home when the youngest child reaches eighteen next year in
order to avoid losing her home. The other meager amount of $257.15
is for her taxes, but that is inadequate to meet that need.
32/ R. 190)

(Tr.

The other amount of over a thousand is a fluctuating

amount that is in her checking account that she uses to pay her
monthly expenses.

That is obviously an account that could go from

zero to a larger amount on payday.

Thus, their representation of

her having over $9,000.00 in disposable and available cash is
grossly misleading and ignores completely the testimony and facts
surrounding the purposes of these amounts.
They next argue that Mrs. Johnson's circumstances have
changed because they claim she has $70,600.00 equity in her home.
This is based upon Mrs. Johnson's Financial Declaration (R. 191)
where she sets the value of her home at $85,000.00. However, this
amount would seem suspect since it is based upon the information
given by her in her Financial Declaration and is not really based
upon testimony in court that is based upon proper foundation.

It

is admitted that a homeowner can testify as to their value of their
home, but even they must establish some foundation to qualify to
testify. The result is that her statement is more speculation than
anything.
However, if we consider that her estimate of value is correct,
the major flaw in Mr. Johnson's testimony is his assertion that she
has over $70,000.00 available to her to live on and thus has
considerable wealth far and above that of Mr. Johnson.
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This

argument has several problems.
First, we must conclude that the Decree of Divorce made an
equitable division of the property of the parties and that if Mrs.
Johnson received the equity in the home, Mr. Johnson likewise
received his fair share of equity plus other property that made the
division- fair and equitable.

If we say that she should resort to

her equity to support herself then why not ask Mr. Johnson to look
to his assets from the marriage to pay alimony.
Next, equity in a home is meaningless unless the home is sold.
Until that time it is merely the home and residence of a family or
individual. These repeated arguments that a home is worth so much
because

of

its

equity

is pointless

since

that

amount

only

materializes if the home is sold. If Mrs. Johnson were to sell her
home where would she live, what would be the costs, how long would
the money last, and in the overall scheme of things how would this
money benefit her?

It is apparent that all this would do is put

her out of her home and into a rental property where the available
funds would dwindle until she no longer had either a home or
equity.
As the court noted in its Findings, Mr. Johnson offered
absolutely no evidence as to what would be accomplished under such
an idea, or how it would work.

Mr. Johnson did not say if she

could obtain a second mortgage, whether she could afford the second
mortgage payments, whether she could even qualify for such a loan,
and whether

a sale or second mortgage would

situation or further cause it to deteriorate.
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ameliorate her
He presented no

evidence of any kind on this concept of asking her to liquidate her
equity in her home.

As the court noted in its Findings (R. 260-

261) "Defendant has asked the court to speculate as to the effects
of refinancing the home and other avenues of relief through
obtaining loans by plaintiff, but no evidence has been presented to
support any finding in defendant's favor, or that such avenues
would provide any relief to the plaintiff."
We therefore submit that considering such information does
nothing to further Mr. Johnson's argument that there has been a
substantial change in circumstances.

The Haslam case that they

cite is based upon much different circumstances and really does not
support the relief they seek.

It is far from being identical.

POINT V:
EVEN IF THE COURT WERE TO FIND THAT THERE HAS BEEN A
SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES THE COURT MUST STILL
FIND THAT CIRCUMSTANCES WARRANT A MODIFICATION, WHICH WE
SUBMIT THEYDO NOT.
The

appellant

mathematics.

wants

to make

this

point

one purely of

They argue that her expenses exceed her income only

by $250.00 and that as a result she should at best only be entitled
to $250.00 per month as alimony.

This is an odd argument since

they are admitting that her expenses exceed her income yet they
claim she is entitled to no alimony.

They then resort to a

reargument of the substantial assets position alleging that the
court ignored the equity in her home and the money in her savings.
We feel we have adequately dealt with these arguments above.
In support of this position they cite certain cases that they
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believe require only three grounds for alimony. However, these are
not correctly cited since these and many other cases require that
alimony "enable the receiving spouse to maintain as nearly as
possible the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage and to
prevent the spouse from becoming a public charge." Eames v. Eames,
735 P2d 395, at 397 (Utah App. 1987) . Mrs. Johnson was married to
the defendant for over 24 years, bore him three children, and
worked in the home as a homemaker and rearing the children for the
entire term of the marriage.

She had a high school education and

no advanced training.
Let us look at what the testimony has revealed about Mrs.
Johnson's living standard:
1. Circuit Breaker Property Tax Relief Program.
2. Utah State Department of Rehabilitation: She qualified for
some assistance with books, career counseling and some tuition from
the State of Utah while obtaining her degree.

The rest she paid

for herself.
3. School Lunch Program: She has an income that qualifies her
daughter for free school lunches.
4. Her LDS ward has contributed over the past years Christmas
gifts, cash, food, money to repair her washer while she used a
scrub board and bucket to clean her laundry.

No money here for

laundromats.
5. Family assistance:

Her birthday and Christmas gifts from

family have been boxes filled with meat and poultry.
given other items of food.
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they have

6. Anonymous cash gifts and gifts of clothing from co-workers.
7. The condition of the home is bad and getting worse in many
ways. Mrs. Johnson's bed frame is broken so her mattress is on the
floor.
8. Friends and Neighbors:

They share their newspapers and

store coupons with Mrs. Johnson.

They have given produce, bread,

and other grocery items, as well as anonymous gift donations.
9. Mr. Johnson has an equitable interest in the home, but has
done nothing to help maintain the home.
10.
broken.

Her.vacuum cleaner, sewing machine and dishwasher are
her washing machine and clothes dryer appear to be on

their last leg. (Tr. 55)
11. She lacks adequate money to purchase birthday, Christmas
and other types of gifts. Mr. Johnson on the other hand is able to
provide his children with various gifts and trips.
12. The family lacks adequate funding for entertainment.
13. Mrs. Johnson has had virtually no new clothes since the
divorce.
POINT VI:
THE ATTORNEY'S FEES AWARDED WERE WARRANTED, FAIR AND
REASONABLE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE.
Mr. Johnson in his brief criticizes Mrs. Johnson's counsel for
having spent 13 hours on a memorandum for the pre-trial settlement
conference.

Counsel has never been criticized before for being

well prepared.

It was hoped that if the court were well apprised

of the law and facts in the case the chances of a settlement would
be increased, which would relieve the substantial burden of trial
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costs on Mrs. Johnson.

When that failed that same memorandum

served as the Trial Memorandum,
preparation of this brief.

and has provided

data for

It would seem to have been well worth

the time, particularly when one considers

that (a) she is only

being billed at $80.00 per hour and (b) the earned and billed fee
was $2,480 but she was awarded only $1,500.
CONCLUSION
1. The Judgment and Decree should be affirmed in total,
including the back amounts of alimony to be paid by Mr. Johnson due
to his unilateral termination of the payment of alimony, plus the
ruling maintaining the alimony at the current level.
2. Mrs. Johnson should be awarded her attorney's fees incurred
for the preparation of this reply brief.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of December, 1996.

GREGORY B. WALL
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee
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